THE TRUTH ABOUT GREECE

I.—THE GRECO-SERVIAN TREATY.
II.—THE LANDING AT SALONICA: A QUEER STORY.
III.—THE EXPEDITION TO SERVIA AND ITS RESULTS.

By G. F. ABBOTT.

WITH AN
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
By P. KATAPODES.

PUBLISHED BY
THE VOICE OF GREECE, 289, Regent Street, London, W. 1.
July, 1917.



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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

By P. Katapodes.

Among the many unjust charges brought against Greece by Entente politicians and organs, in connection with her attitude in the European War, there are two which deserve special attention: first, that Greece deserted her ally Servia; and, second, that the Entente Armies went to Salonika after an understanding between the Entente and the Greek Governments; but that as soon as the Entente forces had established themselves in Greek Macedonia, Greece, far from helping them, resumed a hostile attitude towards them, with the result that the superb Entente legions under General Sarrail could not move against Bulgaria, and thus save Servia and Rumania, being afraid of "a stab in the back from the junta(!) of the Greek army under King Constantine."

Much has been said and written in refutation of these two charges. Mr. Abbott — an English author of repute, whom no English patriot will accuse of being an "enemy agent" — shows, in the dispassionate tone of an historian, that both charges are unjust: that is, first, that Greece was not bound by any treaty to assist Servia by force of arms, and that, if such a treaty ever existed, it had been repudiated and destroyed by Servia herself; and, second, that the Entente Allies went to Salonica *not* after an understanding with the Greek Government, but were actuated solely by their own interests, relying on the Right of their Might.

Mr. Asquith said at the Guildhall, on the 9th of November, 1916, "As all the world knows, we and our French Allies did not go to Salonica as invaders and trespassers. We went there with the assent of the Greek Government, and as the friends of both Servia and Greece."

Mr. Abbott's revelations are supported by facts, by official documents, and by the Censor, who, after the publication of the first and second chapters, not without excision, found it "entirely contrary

to the national interest," (though not contrary to the dictates of Truth and Justice), and "very undesirable" to allow more light to be thrown on a question which concerns international morality. The Prime Minister's statement, however, cannot be supported by any similar evidence, "as all the world knows." We certainly do not suggest that Mr. Asquith intended wilfully to mislead his nation, which had put its faith in him. What Mr. Asquith said was, we believe, true according to the information he had: Such information, however, was, whatever its source, profoundly untrustworthy. To this grave error, which has shaken Greek faith in the avowed humanity of the Entente Allies, Mr. Venizelos (the "Great Visionary Greek" of the Entente Allies) has abundantly contributed by his characteristic "optimistic views," of which, as King Constantine — the man of rare foresight, the man of iron will, one of the heroes of Greece — remarked, "not one-twentieth has ever been justified."

However friendly may have been the intentions of England and her Allies, the Greek people, "as all the world knows," have suffered much from the moment of that fateful Salonica "visit" of their friends whose "protecting blockade" caused many deaths from hunger among them, unwilling as they were to commit national suicide in order to please blundering politicians, and too noble to be ungrateful to their King whom they worship as a national hero.

As to the anti-Entente designs of Greece and her King, all those Ententists who know the sentiments of the Greek people towards the Entente nations, and who are strong and noble enough to acknowledge that the Entente nations cannot be too grateful to King Constantine for his policy which has saved Greece from ruin and kept the English route to India safe — not to mention the fact that, without Greek tolerance, the Entente Powers could neither help Servia nor attack Turkey and Bulgaria — will indignantly dismiss the "fear of a stab in the back from the Greeks" as an idle invention, or, at the most, as an unfortunate diplomatic blunder in which the Greek Government had no share.

The Entente Allies should be willing to bear the responsibility of their miscalculations and not seek to transfer it to the shoulders of a friendly nation and its chivalrous King.

June, 1917.

THE TRUTH ABOUT GREECE*

By G. F. ABBOTT.

(*Author of "Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers."*)

I.—THE GRECO-SERVIAN TREATY.

THE military treaty between Greece and Servia, signed on May 19th, 1913, before the second Balkan War, was based on a state of things which was naturally altered by the results of that war. These changes led the authorities at Athens to the opinion that it was necessary, in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty, that the two General Staffs should consult together in order to arrange a plan of future co-operation. Up to a certain time this opinion appears to have been shared by the authorities at Belgrade, for on March 21st, 1914, the Greek Minister in the Servian capital informed his Government that the Servian Government asked for a Greek officer to be sent to Belgrade to discuss with Voivode Poutnik, Chief of the Servian General Staff, the terms of a new agreement, and in May Colonel Vlachopoulos was dispatched by the Hellenic Government to open the negotiations.

Immediately on his arrival at Belgrade the Colonel called on the Voivode, and was told that he would be invited to a discussion at the proper moment. After waiting ten days in vain, the Greek officer reminded the Servian Minister of War and the Premier, M. Passitch, of the object of his mission. But even after this step he failed to obtain an answer. His impatience can easily be imagined, for the relations between Greece and Turkey at the time — owing to Turkey's refusal to recognise the claim of Greece to the islands ceded to her by the Treaty of Bucharest — were very strained, and everything pointed to the probability that, in the event of a Greco-Turkish rupture, Bulgaria would not remain passive: in other words, there was reason to fear the very crisis which the Greco-Servian alliance had been formed to meet. But Servia had small comfort to give the Greek emissary. On the contrary, on June 1st, at an audience with the Crown Prince at which he explained, at his Royal Highnesss request, the point which the Greco-Turkish dispute had been reached, he was told that, as Servia found it absolutely impossible to come to her ally's assistance, Greece should not push her differences with Turkey too far. The same advice

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was at the same time tendered to the Hellenic Government by the Servian Government.

This refusal of assistance constituted in itself a denunciation of the Greco-Servian Treaty. Nevertheless, the Greek General Staff continued its efforts to open negotiations with the Servian General Staff, if not on the basis of the Treaty, at least on the basis of the common interests of the two countries, in view of the Bulgarian danger to which both alike were exposed; and on July 30th, 1914, it demanded that the Hellenic Government should sound the Servian Government if, in case Bulgaria ordered a general mobilisation, Servia would be disposed to bring part of her forces against her, so as to prevent the concentration of the Bulgarian forces and give the Greek army time to mobilise. The Servian Government, apparently, was then too engrossed by the outbreak of the European War to pay any attention to this communication. On receiving no answer, the Greek General Staff telegraphed to Colonel Vlachopoulos as follows: "Should only Turkey attack Greece, the latter might, by making a supreme effort, bear the shock single-handed; but if Bulgaria joined in the attack, it would be indispensable for Servia to oppose to her at least 100,000 men in order to prevent her concentration. It would be well for the Greek General Staff to know the views of the Servian General Staff on the subject of eventual action, so that Greece might take her measures accordingly."

Colonel Vlachopoulos communicated this message to the Servian Headquarters, and was informed by M. Passitch that at a Council, in which the Crown Prince took part, it was decided that, so long as there was no imminent danger from the side of Bulgaria, Servia could not move troops from the Austrian to the Bulgarian frontier, first on account of the obligations she had contracted towards the Entente, and secondly because the Servian army had already assumed the offensive on the Austrian front. M. Passitch repeated this statement to the Greek Minister at Nish, adding that, in case of imminent danger from the side of Bulgaria, he intended to consult on the necessary measures first the Powers of the Entente. The Hellenic Government from these two statements drew the conclusion that Servia, by her alliance with the Entente Powers, had undertaken new obligations which deprived her of her freedom to fulfil her obligations towards Greece, even in the case of a Bulgarian attack.

Thus stood matters from August, 1914, until March, 1915, when the Greek General Staff once more tried to get into touch with the Servian General Staff in order to ascertain at least the forces avail-

able against Bulgaria, and concert a plan of operations. To that end it called Colonel Vlachopoulos to Athens, and on April 3rd gave him written instructions in which stress was laid on the necessity that Servia should concentrate real forces on the Bulgaro-Servian frontier, for it feared already some Bulgarian attack. Among other things, it stated that "The moment Bulgaria invaded Servia, the Bulgarian danger for the latter would be greater and more imminent than the Austrian. Bulgarian troops, entering Servia through the district of Egri-Palanka, would render a retreat to the south impossible, and the Servian army would find itself pressed between the Austrians and the Bulgars." It went on to add, "If the Servian General Staff concur with these views, it would be desirable that a consultation should at once take place between the two General Staffs in order to study in advance the conditions of a military co-operation in case Bulgaria abandoned her neutrality; for any attempt at such an understanding at the moment of the attack would come too late." Colonel Vlachopoulos on his return to Nish succeeded on April 17th, in obtaining from the Servian authorities permission to go to Krajujevatz to meet Voivode Poutnik, to whom he communicated the views and proposals of the Greek General Staff. But the Voivode refused categorically to enter into any conversations whatever on the subject, "for," he said, "the present military situation does not permit any thoughts in that direction."

In spite of successive rebuffs, the Greek General Staff once more, in June, approached the Servian Government with detailed proposals for common action against Bulgaria, dwelling again on the necessity of a preliminary concentration of sufficient Servian troops along the Bulgarian frontier to counterbalance the Bulgarian advantage in rapidity of mobilisation. These fresh efforts at an understanding proved as fruitless as all the preceding. It is probable that the Servian General Staff felt convinced that, even if Bulgaria attacked Greece, she would not dare attack Servia, the ally of the Entente Powers. But be the motive of Servia's attitude what it may, its meaning was unmistakable. It meant that Servia, fettered by her new obligations towards the Entente, as well as by her own new requirements took no longer any account of the Greco-Servian Treaty.

In the weeks that followed, Bulgaria's attitude grew more and more menacing. The news of Bulgarian grand manœuvres and the raids of Bulgarian *komitadjis* into Servian territory, it would seem, ended by rousing Servia to a sense of her danger; and, on August 2nd, the Servian Minister of War took the opportunity offered him by a visit from Colonel Vlachopoulos to mention the need of an understanding between the two

General Staffs, and of co-operation in case of a Bulgarian attack. Colonel Vlachopoulos told him that he had again and again endeavoured to enter into negotiations on that subject, and had never succeeded in obtaining a hearing. Eight days afterwards he had with Colonel Pavlovitch, *Chef de la Section des Opérations*, a conversation in which the Servian officer stated that his country could not transport at the moment to the northern part of the Bulgarian frontier more than one or two divisions, nor could it concentrate there the rest of its available forces except after a declaration of war. As to South Servia, she would have to be left with the eight regiments made up of the 1915 conscripts — that is, raw recruits. In return, he demanded that Greece should mobilise very quickly, attack Bulgaria, and send a portion of her forces into Servia to act against the Bulgars. Colonel Vlachopoulos carried these proposals to Athens in person — for Servia had a year since recalled her military attaché from the Hellenic capital, and the transmision of such a delicate matter by telegraph at such a time was out of the question — and submitted them to the General Staff on August 20th.

Meanwhile the situation had grown worse, and the fear which the Greek General Staff had expressed in the previous spring that it would be too late for an understanding had been fully realised: from every side came intelligence of the concentration of Austro-German forces towards the Danube. . . .

On September 1st the Greek General Staff submitted to the Minister of War the report brought by Colonel Vlachopoulos and set forth its own views on the new state of things, expressing the opinion that for Greece to participate with Servia in a war against Bulgaria, Austria, and Germany, so long as she was not assured of the co-operation of other Allied forces in sufficient numbers and in good time, was tantamount to courting annihilation. For, the moment the Servian army found itself faced by a superior Austro-German army, the Greeks would have to fight the Bulgars, as well as, in all probability, the Turks alone. . . .

Towards the end of September the Servian Colonel Milovanovitch arrived at Athens to ask what was Greece going to do. Lieut.-Colonel Metaxas, of the Greek General Staff, asked him in his turn what were France and England going to do? The Serb replied that he knew nothing about the Anglo-French forces. As to Servia, he was only able to supply information of a general character: concerning the composition and the effective strength of the forces available against the Bulgars he could say no more than that the Servian group to the

south-west of Egri-Palanka consisted of about thirty battalions, made up of Serbo-Macedonian conscripts; which was just why the Servian General Staff had expressed the wish that two or three Greek army corps might be concentrated in that sector. Lieut.-Colonel Metaxas explained to him that it was impossible for Greece to leave against the strong Bulgarian contingents which threatened Greek Macedonia only two army corps, so that she might reinforce with the rest of her army the Servian right, for if these two corps were beaten, the whole of Eastern Macedonia, and perhaps Salonica itself, would fall into the hands of the Bulgars, and the only lines of communication of the Greek army, which were also those of the Servian army, would be cut.

The visit of Colonel Milovanovitch to Athens served only to turn the apprehensions of the Greek General Staff into certainty. It was now evident that, if Greece entered into the war, she would be left isolated. The Serbs did not want to concentrate in Servian Macedonia other troops than those of inferior quality which were there already. The French and English, in spite of their assurances, having no available troops, would be able to concentrate in Macedonia only by dribblets. A strong Russian landing in Bulgaria— the only operation which could influence that country seriously — did not seem probable for the moment. Lastly, Rumania was nowise disposed to take part in the war. Under these circumstances Greece reasoned that it would be madness for her to plunge into a struggle in the course of which the Austrians and the Germans, who could concentrate very easily superior forces to those of Servia, would succeed in crushing the latter, while Bulgaria, turning with nearly the whole of her army against isolated Greece, would be able to inflict upon her an equally complete defeat. On the other hand, by holding aloof, she would preserve her military resources intact, while Bulgaria was using up hers. . . .

After glancing at the facts set forth above, who could accuse Greece of having failed to do her duty by her ally? For a whole year she strove to get into touch with Servia and to concert, in time, a plan of mutual defence. And all the time Servia, bound by her new ties to the Powers of the Entente, found herself absolutely unable to carry out her old obligations towards Greece — or even to consult with her about a fresh agreement for the common action, while Austria and Germany still had their hands full elsewhere. When she did offer to do so, it was no longer a question of fighting the Balkan enemies, in reference to whom alone the Treaty had originally been concluded, but of dragging Greece into the struggle of the Entente Powers against the Empires of Central Europe *and* their allies: a struggle which, for

Greece, meant destruction in view of the paucity of the Entente forces in the East. These facts also supply the answer to a riddle that must have puzzled many a newspaper reader: why it was that, while French and English onlookers have been reproaching Greece bitterly for her supposed desertion of Servia, the Serbs themselves have not uttered one word of complaint.

II.—THE LANDING AT SALONIKA: A QUEER STORY.

SINCE 1915 British citizens throughout the Empire have been longing for an authoritative explanation of two of our failures: the Gallipoli tragedy and its sequel, the Greek tragi-comedy. As to the first, our desire was at last gratified a few days ago — after a fashion — by the publication of the Dardanelles Report. Upon the second we are still waiting for the Government to speak — and are likely to be kept waiting. Such being the case, I consider it no presumption on my part to offer the public a few facts, valuable in themselves and none the less interesting for being in the nature of "revelations."

When the Entente Powers asked Greece to go to Servia's assistance, in case of a Bulgarian attack, M. Venizelos expressed himself willing to do so on certain conditions. He stipulated, First, that the Allies should send to the Balkan Peninsula 150,000 men — Europeans, not natives of Africa or Asia — to take the place of the contingents which, by the Greco-Servian Treaty, Servia was bound to contribute in the event of joint action against Bulgaria: he made this demand a *sine qua non*, partly in order to remove the objection raised against the Greco-Servian alliance by the opponents of his policy that it had become null through Servia's failure to discharge her obligations, and partly because, without such help, it was physically impossible for Greece to enter the field. Secondly, that, so long as Greece was still technically neutral, the landing of the Allied forces at Salonica could not have the Hellenic Government's official sanction: her neutrality, however benevolent towards the Entente, made it imperative for Greece to lodge a formal protest. After fulfilling that formality, the Hellenic Government would afford the Allies the same facilities as at Lemnos. But the matter was not so simple at Salonica as at Lemnos: provision had to be made here for the smooth disembarkation and journey to Servia of a large army with all its impedimenta, and moreover these

measures had to be harmonised with the necessities of Greece's own mobilisation. The problem, owing to the primitive character of transport means in Macedonia, presented no end of difficulties requiring careful handling by experts. Therefore, M. Venizelos stipulated, Thirdly, that Greece should have at least twenty-four hours' notice.

All these conditions were accepted by the Entente, with one exception: the British Government did not want Greece to protest against the landing, lest her protest, though merely formal, should give Germany a chance to say that the Allies did to Greece what she herself had done to Belgium. Why, said the Foreign Office, protest at all, since the landing would be effected with your collaboration? However, M. Venizelos insisted.

The question was at that stage still under discussion, when, suddenly, on September 29th, 1915, without a word of warning to the Hellenic Government, the French Consul at Salonica, accompanied by the captain of a French man-of-war and two officers from the Dardanelles, called on General Moschopoulos, the Military Governor of Salonica, and informed him that, in pursuance of the *understanding* (!) arrived at between the Greek Premier and the French Minister at Athens, they were going to arrange for the landing of French troops and to provide for the defence of Salonica against hostile submarines. At the same time, Sir Ian Hamilton arrived at Salonica with his staff and informed the Governor that the Allies were going to occupy part of the town and port and put them in a state of defence preparatory to the landing of the forces. I do not know how a British Governor would have behaved on a similar position; but the Greek replied with absolute politeness and no less firmness that, without orders from his Government, it would be his painful duty to oppose any violation of Greek territory. . . .

As soon as a report of these singular proceedings reached him, M. Venizelos drew up a vigorous protest in which, after recapitulating the negotiations between himself and the Entente Powers, he pointed out to them that their contemplated action, so far from being in accordance with an understanding, was calculated to create a very serious misunderstanding between Greece and the Allies. Such action, he declared, could not be carried out until after Greece had lodged a formal protest, and even then the Hellenic Government reserved to itself the right to decide, without foreign interference, to what extent its port and its railways should be used by the Allies, its decision being guided by its regard for the requirements of its own army, then in course of mobilisation.

The protest of M. Venizelos, I can affirm without fear of contradiction, was not a mere matter of form: it breathed a spirit of indignation such as no subsequent Greek Premier has ventured to display in his protests against the encroachments of France and England upon the sovereignty of the Hellenic Kingdom. M. Venizelos bitterly resented the action of the Allies as an unwarrantable attempt to rush him into a compromising position: to commit Greece, before France and England had bound themselves by a definite agreement.

Who was responsible for this grave misdemeanour — the first of the many performances which, little by little, converted the love of the Greek nation for us into something different? Does the credit for this masterly ineptitude belong to the men in Downing Street, the men in the Quai d'Orsay, or the men in the Dardanelles? The question is worth asking. I hope some Member of Parliament will ask it — and get an answer: a true answer, if possible. Meanwhile the reflection forces itself upon one: how could we have hoped to see Greek statesmen of the school of M. Skouloudis gained over by a diplomacy which managed so successfully to goad even M. Venizelos — its wholehearted partisan — into angry protests?

Needless to say that the Premier by protesting voiced the resentment of the whole Greek nation. The action of the Allies would have irritated the Greeks in any circumstances; but the circumstances under which it took place were of a nature to deepen irritation into alarm. Just the day before (September 28th) Sir Edward Grey had stated in the House of Commons amid the loud "Hear, hear!" of his audience, "Not only is there no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a warm feeling of sympathy," and he went on to emphasise once more the Balkan policy of the Entente Powers. "Our policy," he said, "has been to secure agreement between the Balkan States, which would assure to each of them, not only independence, but a brilliant future, based as a general principle on *the territorial and political union of kindred nationalities. To secure this agreement, we have recognised that the legitimate aspirations of all Balkan States must find satisfaction.*"

To understand the full effect of this statement upon the Greek and Servian minds, it is necessary to note two things. First, neither Greece nor Servia had consented to endorse the policy it describes, for neither recognised the Bulgarian aspirations as legitimate, holding, on the contrary, that, on the principle of nationality, the parts of Macedonia which Bulgaria claimed were, respectively, Greek and Servian, and in 1913 they had fought Bulgaria to vindicate their rights. The utmost

that the Entente had got Greece and Servia to consent to was to yield some of the territories in question to Bulgaria if, with her co-operation, they succeeded in compensating themselves at the expense of Turkey and Austria. Bulgaria had refused to co-operate on those terms, demanding that the territories she coveted should be handed over to her *at once*. In face of this knot two courses were open to the Entente: either to coerce Greece and Servia into a concession to Bulgaria, or to support them against her, if the latter showed any hostile inclinations towards them. The Entente, so far, had restrained from committing itself definitely to either course, its diplomacy being simply one of "wait and see."

After waiting for nearly a year, our diplomatists had now an opportunity of seeing. This brings me to the second point. When Sir Edward Grey made his statement, Bulgaria had already mobilised her forces — after having received from Germany guns, money, and even military officers — and no doubt could any longer be entertained by any sane mind as to her intention to join in the Austro-German attack on Servia. The Greeks, who know the Bulgars, had refused to be deluded by the Sofia Government's official announcement of "armed neutrality," and had replied by immediately beginning to mobilise their own forces (September 23rd), in order to go, with the co-operation of the Entente Powers, to Servia's assistance. Such were the ideas with which the Hellenic Government had carried on the negotiations already described, nor could they suppose the British and French Governments blind to a situation which was so plain to themselves. They believed that London and Paris were as well informed about the significance of the Bulgarian movements as was Athens, and they had been hourly expecting to see the Entente Powers drop their blandishments towards Bulgaria and treat with her according to her conduct. They expected that the least the Entente Powers would do would be to declare that the offers of Greek and Servian territory they had made to King Ferdinand would be withdrawn, if within so many days he did not either disarm or side with the Entente.

Instead of such a declaration, the Greeks heard Sir Edward Grey assuring the Bulgars of his "warm sympathy" with "their legitimate aspirations!" What could this expression of British goodwill towards Bulgaria, at such a moment, mean? Had Sir Edward Grey gone mad, or was he talking in his sleep? The Greeks — including M. Venizelos and the Government over which he presided — were still wondering, when, a few hours after the report of the Grey statement reached Athens, there came the news of the Anglo-French step at Salonica to turn their

mystification into consternation. The inference which they drew from this sequence of events was — to put it briefly and bluntly — that the Entente Powers harboured the sinister design to use the expedition dispatched to the relief of Servia as a means for despoiling both Greece and Servia on behalf of the Bulgars — that they intended to try to buy King Ferdinand, at the last moment, by handing over to him the portions of Macedonia which they had tried in vain to induce Greece and Servia to yield to Bulgaria. It may be added that the Greek suspicions were fully shared by the Serbs.

We, of course, are bound to believe that neither our Government nor those of our Allies are capable of a dishonourable motive; but strangers, knowing nothing about our motives, are apt to judge us only by our actions. And, it must be confessed, the Allies' action, following upon Sir Edward Grey's speech, did look suspicious. If the intentions of the Allies were pure, their mode of procedure, by whatever standard it may be judged, certainly was peculiar. So peculiar, indeed, that even M. Venizelos and his Government, despite their ardent desire to serve the cause of the Entente, were forced to protest. . . .

Whether the Greco-Servian interpretation of the Anglo-French step was correct or not, is a question which cannot be decided until the correspondence between the two Foreign Offices and their diplomatic agents abroad is submitted to impartial examination; and this will not happen in our time. All that we can say at present is that it was an interpretation based upon the knowledge of England's long-cherished bias for Bulgaria. Ever since 1885 it has been the British Government's idea that the solution of the Balkan problem lay in the realisation of the Bulgarian dream of supremacy. For thirty years the British Government had worked towards that end with unwearied persistence and a ruthless disregard of both Greek and Serbian interests.(1) Hitherto its efforts had been frustrated by Russia's bias for Servia and France's bias for Greece. Now, however, in obedience to the "give and take" principle without which the Anglo-Franco-Russian Alliance would have fallen to pieces, Paris and Petrograd had given London a free hand — as is clearly proved by the Grey statement. Hence the alarm which inspired the protest of M. Venizelos.

The Greek Premier, in order to set the public mind, as well as his own, at rest, and to avert any deplorable complications — for, be it

(1) As the whole story of this phase of British policy and the series of events which have marked its course is fully set forth in "Turkey, Greece and the Great Power" (pp. 160, 298 foll.), I refer the reader to that book, and I shall say nothing more about it here.

remembered, though its mobilisation was not yet completed, the Greek nation was already in arms, and an armed nation in a state of alarm about its dearest interests is prone to kick over the traces — asked the Entente Powers to hasten to announce, plainly and solemnly, that the promises they had made to Bulgaria no longer held, and to give a pledge that the dispatch of an expedition to Servia would, under no circumstances, entail any peril to Greek and Servian territorial integrity. Unless that was done, he declared, no Greek Government could have a hand in the landing of international troops at Salonica.

Unfortunately the time for words had passed. No statement could at that moment alter the course of events. Destiny moved too fast for diplomacy. M. Venizelos uttered his warning on October 1st. On the 2nd the Bulgarian forces began to mass on the Servian frontier, while simultaneously the Austro-German battalions were fighting their way across the Danube. On the 4th Russia launched her ultimatum on Bulgaria: the Tsar's Minister was to leave Sofia if king Ferdinand did not, within twenty-four hours, openly break with the enemies of the Slav cause, and expel all German and Austrian officers.

The rapid fulfilment of their own prognostications roused the Greeks to the highest pitch of excitement. But all faith in the Entente had not yet been extinguished. On the very day on which the Petrograd Cabinet delivered its tardy and ineffective ultimatum at Sofia, in Athens the Chamber held a historic debate which ended with a vote of confidence in M. Venizelos's policy of going to Servia's assistance. The vote was passed in the belief that the Allies would keep the promise they had made to the Greek premier to send to Servia 150,000 men. When next day (October 5th) the Allied forces turned up at Salonica, M. Venizelos, his King, and his people had the mortification to find that they amounted to . . . ! Nor did they approach the stipulated figure for months after Servia's fate had been sealed. . . .

To the feeling of confidence which had prompted that vote immediately succeeded a feeling of panic. What! cried everybody in Athens, are we to stake our liberty — our national existence — on such a chance: say (at a maximum) 350,000 Greeks *plus* 250,000 half-exhausted Serbs *plus* . . . Allies, against (at a minimum) 500,000 Austro-Germans *plus* 400,000 fresh Bulgars *plus* 100,000 fresh Turks? Nay, if the English and the French love gambling, we don't: we cannot afford the luxury! Venizelos has allowed himself to be duped. . . .

Faced with such a crisis, M. Venizelos did the only thing he could do: he resigned (October 6th); and his country, faced with the abyss, did the only thing it could do: it shrank back on to the solid ground of neutrality.

From that fateful day, M. Venizelos has been held by the bulk of the Greek nation accountable for all the sorrows they have experienced at the hands of the Entente: all these calamities are traced back to his unfortunate negotiations. I cannot share this view. His policy, in itself, was sound enough, and the only fault I can find with the way in which he carried it on is that it lacked the element of scepticism. The *Times* said the other day: "Mr. Abbott is sometimes less than fair to M. Venizelos." That is less than fair to me. I have the greatest possible respect for M. Venizelos, both as a man and as a statesman; but I cannot be blind to his defects. He is too apt to credit others with his own candour — a most amiable defect, and one that captivated me by its charming unexpectedness from the first moment (now eight years ago) I had the pleasure of meeting him, but none the less a defect, considering the sort of world in which we live. On the other hand, his protest shows that he had not carried his credulity to the length of committing Greece irrevocably to the Allies. He had pledged her only on certain definite conditions — conditions which the Allies had accepted It would be very unjust to blame him for other people's failure to fulfil their engagements.

Such, then, to conclude, was the part of the Greek Premier in proceedings which, we have been assured, were carried out at his invitation! If these proceedings were the work of private individuals and not of States, the only term applicable to them would be one that courtesy forbids me to employ. In the absence of a code of international morality, it is difficult to suggest a phrase. . . .

The reader of this queer story will naturally ask: is it true? I answer: To the best of my knowledge and belief, every syllable of it. In proof, I challenge the Foreign Office to publish the documents; solemnly promising, on my part, to withdraw and apologise for any statement of fact that is not confirmed by documentary evidence.

III.—THE EXPEDITION TO SERVIA AND ITS RESULTS.

[*We regret to disappoint those readers who have been following with great interest Mr. G. F. Abbott's articles entitled "The Truth About Greece." Sir E. T. Cook, the Director of the Press Bureau, considers the publication of these articles "entirely contrary to the Notional interest," and the publication of the above article would be, he says, "very undesirable." We dutifully bend the knee to the Chief Censor and, in the Nationol interest, suppress Mr. Abbott's third and remaining articles.*—EDITOR.]